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Do Fiscal Rules Matter?†
By Veronica Grembi, Tommaso Nannicini, and Ugo Troiano*
Fiscal rules are laws aimed at reducing the incentive to accu-
mulate debt, and many countries adopt them to discipline local 
governments. Yet, their effectiveness is disputed because of com-
mitment and enforcement problems. We study their impact applying 
a  quasi-experimental design in Italy. In 1999, the central govern-
ment imposed fiscal rules on municipal governments, and in 2001 
relaxed them below 5,000 inhabitants. We exploit the before/after 
and discontinuous policy variation, and show that relaxing fiscal 
rules increases deficits and lowers taxes. The effect is larger if the 
mayor can be reelected, the number of parties is higher, and voters 
are older. (JEL E62, H71, H72, H74, R51)
Fiscal rules are laws designed to constrain fiscal policy. Many countries have adopted fiscal rules to discipline local governments, including Argentina, 
Austria, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Italy, Mexico, 
Poland, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey. In all of the above mentioned countries, fis-
cal rules are imposed by the national government on local governments.1 Despite 
their wide diffusion, there is no consensus about whether fiscal restraints matter for 
increasing fiscal stability. A number of studies have argued that there are several 
reasons why fiscal rules might be ineffective in restraining fiscal policy (see the 
1 Although in a few countries fiscal rules are self-imposed by fiscal authorities, it should be noted that one of 
the most cited examples of fiscal rules, the European Stability Pact, is also not self-imposed, but imposed by the 
European Union on the member countries. 
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reviews by Alesina and Perotti 1996, and Wyplosz 2012), for instance because of 
commitment or enforcement problems.2
Studying whether fiscal rules matter for policies is challenging. The search for 
a definitive conclusion about how fiscal rules affect fiscal policy has been ham-
pered by the potentially endogenous decision of whether to adopt a fiscal rule in 
the first place (Poterba 1996 or Alesina and Perotti 1996).3 In this paper, we study 
the effect of relaxing fiscal restraints at the local government level. We first show 
 quasi-experimentally that fiscal rules do matter for restraining the accumulation 
of debt and that fiscal adjustment seems to be concentrated on revenues. We then 
give evidence suggesting that the adjustment is driven by cities with more political 
distortions.
Our testing ground is Italy, where the central government set a target on deficit 
reduction for all municipal governments in 1999—the so called “Domestic Stability 
Pact,” henceforth, DSP—and relaxed it for municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants 
in 2001. The main rule established by the DSP imposed a gradual reduction of the 
“fiscal gap,” defined as the municipal deficit net of transfers and debt service.4 In 
the regulatory environment we study, there is a central authority that can collect 
standardized public accounts and enforce punishment for noncompliers. Yet, the 
approval of the DSP was accompanied by widespread skepticism about its effec-
tiveness, because Italy usually ranks last among OECD countries in ratings of 
law enforcement and government effectiveness (e.g., see Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi 2010). In other words, our results suggest that the lessons we draw from 
Italian cities on the effectiveness of fiscal restraints may extend to other regulatory 
environments where the fiscal authority setting the rules faces critical ex ante com-
mitment problems.
To study the effects of relaxing the fiscal rules, we cannot adopt a regression 
discontinuity design because there is another policy, the salary of the mayor, 
that changes sharply at the threshold of 5,000 inhabitants. We cannot apply a 
 difference-in-differences design because large and small municipalities are typically 
on differential trends in public policies.5 Therefore, we combine two sources of 
2 The fact that subnational policymakers have limited discretion in changing fiscal policy is the central reason 
for which fiscal rules on local governments might not work. Furthermore, most fiscal rules, including those we 
study, are not embedded in the Constitution. This implies that fiscal responsibility laws can be frequently changed 
and revised, and they might suffer from the same time inconsistency problem that characterizes fiscal policy. 
Additionally, Alesina and Perotti (1996) argue that lax enforcement is one of the reasons why fiscal rules might not 
work. This concern, however, is more relevant at the national level, since at the local level the central government 
can be a credible enforcement authority. Finally, rules usually target only some parts of the budget and this offers 
opportunities for policymakers to sidestep the rules by complying with them without changing the overall fiscal 
discipline—see Milesi-Ferretti (2004). 
3 As indicated by Drazen (2002) in a review article: “A key question (perhaps the key question) about fiscal rules 
is whether they have the effect of slowing the growth of deficits.” Furthermore, there has been limited investigation 
on fiscal rules at the local government level, where forms of “hidden” public debt can grow and raise fears about the 
overall financial sustainability of a country. For a review of the current state of the literature, see Glaeser (2013). 
4 The rationale for the exemption of municipalities with less than 5,000 inhabitants in 2001 was to avoid bur-
dening very small towns with onerous requirements, as they may be disadvantaged by economies of scale in man-
aging the municipal government. The penalties put in place for not complying with the DSP included a cut in the 
annual transfers from the central government, a ban on new hires, and a cut on reimbursement and non-absenteeism 
bonuses. 
5 We verify in online Appendix Figure A1 that the assumption of parallel trends does not hold in a standard 
difference-in-differences design. 
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variation, before/after 2001 and just below/above 5,000 inhabitants, and imple-
ment what we called a “difference-in-discontinuities” (or diff-in-disc) design: tak-
ing the difference between the pretreatment and the posttreatment discontinuity at 
5,000 inhabitants, in order to difference out the effect of the salary of the mayor. We 
propose and verify a set of diagnostic tests for this design.
We divide our empirical analysis into three parts. First, we analyze the effects of 
relaxing fiscal restraints on the deficit, which is the main policy variable of inter-
est, and on the fiscal gap, which is the main target of the law. We find that relaxing 
fiscal rules translates into a larger fiscal gap of about 30 percent over the course of 
the following four years. This large effect on the main target of the DSP has real 
consequences for policy outcomes, as unconstrained municipalities increase their 
deficit by about 20 euros per capita (2 percent of the total budget). The magnitude 
of this effect appears to be sensitive to the bandwidth we consider, but the sign and 
statistical significance of the effect is robust.
In the second part of our empirical analysis, we study the composition of the 
fiscal adjustment, by analyzing municipal financial reports and administrative data 
on municipal tax rates, which are set by the local policymakers. We find that munic-
ipalities for which the rule is relaxed have statistically similar expenditure levels 
compared to constrained ones, although the standard errors are large, also because of 
the presence of outliers. Additionally, we find that unconstrained municipalities have 
lower tax revenues. This difference can be partially explained by the additional find-
ing that municipalities for which fiscal rules are relaxed set lower tax rates. The main 
tax rates decided by Italian cities are a real estate tax rate on home property (Imposta 
comunale sugli Immobili, ICI), which provides almost 50 percent of municipal tax 
revenues, and a surcharge on the personal income tax (Imposta sul reddito delle 
persone Fisiche, IRPEF), which amounts for about 10 percent of municipal tax rev-
enues. Cities for which fiscal rules are relaxed have both a lower real estate tax rate 
(by about 14 percent) and a lower income tax surcharge (by about 30 percent) after 
the policy shift. The fact that we find an effect not only for the target of the DSP, but 
also both for the main policy variable of interest not targeted by the law (deficit) and 
for tax rates, alleviates concerns arising from the possibility of creative accounting.
Finally, in the third part of the analysis, we exploit the fact that our setup—that 
is, an exogenously imposed fiscal destabilization—can provide new evidence on 
when fiscal restraints matter the most. On the one hand, the optimal tax smoothing 
theory would suggest that the main cost of imposing fiscal rules is restricting coun-
tercyclical deficits.6 On the other hand, fiscal restraints might increase welfare if 
deficit is the suboptimal result of the interplay between rational politicians, voters, 
and interest groups.
We first study if the relaxation of fiscal rules is affected by whether the mayor 
faces a binding term limit or not. We find that the increase in deficit arises only for 
mayors who can be reelected. This result is consistent with models linking deficits 
to reelection incentives (Aghion and Bolton 1990) or to politicians’ pandering to 
voters (Maskin and Tirole 2004).
6 See Barro (1974), Barro (1979), and Lucas and Stokey (1983). 
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We then see whether municipalities with a different number of political parties 
represented in the local legislative assembly reacted differently to the relaxation of 
the restraints. Our results show that the higher the number of parties, the more the 
deficit increased after the relaxation of the restraint. This finding may be consistent 
with models that explain fiscal instability as the result of political fragmentation 
and of dynamic common pool (Persson and Tabellini 2000), although this is one 
among the many potential interpretations and our setting does not allow us to dis-
criminate among the different models of the effects of political parties on deficit, 
or even to rule out alternative hypotheses (e.g., see Pettersson-Lidbom 2012). We 
also show that cities that increase the municipal deficit after the relaxation of fiscal 
rules have an older population. These results may be consistent with the model of 
Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2012), according to which young citizens have a 
disciplining role for fiscal policy because they internalize the future costs of present 
fiscal instability. Finally, we show that the increase in deficit arises only for mayors 
who are slower in providing public goods.7
Our results survive a large number of robustness checks. Among those, we use the 
introduction of the DSP for all municipalities in 1999 as a falsification test to show 
that our results are not driven by cities just below and just above 5,000 responding 
differently to the same set of fiscal rules. This test suggests that better paid (and, 
hence, better selected) mayors do not react differently to the introduction of the DSP 
compared to the other mayors. This is also reassuring for the external validity of our 
results. Additionally, we repeat this falsification exercise by interacting our treat-
ment variable with the heterogeneity dimensions discussed above, in order to show 
that the law did not bind differently across those subsamples. We also show that 
there is no difference in manipulative sorting around 5,000 between the pretreatment 
and the posttreatment period, and—last but not least—that municipalities just below 
and just above the threshold were on parallel trends in the pretreatment period.
This paper relates to two strands of literature. First, we contribute to the litera-
ture that has analyzed the effectiveness of fiscal rules.8 Previous evidence primarily 
comes from cross-country comparisons in specific regions, such as the European 
Union (see Hallerberg and Von Hagen 1999; Debrun et al. 2008) or Latin America 
(see Gavin and Perotti 1997), and from local governments in a federal state, such 
7 Our results suggest that fiscal restraints on subnational governments may have the positive welfare benefits 
mentioned above because they may bind more on municipalities characterized by higher political distortions, and 
limited welfare costs and because the tools for countercyclical fiscal policy are often administered at the coun-
try level (as discussed by Gavin and Perotti 1997 and Hines, Gale, and Knight 2010). Thus, our heterogeneous 
treatment effects can offer a suggestive explanation for the empirical fact that fiscal rules are much more likely 
to be observed for local rather than national governments around the world, as documented by Glaeser (2013). 
However, the nature of our evidence does not allow us to draw definite conclusions about the welfare effects of the 
intervention. 
8 For surveys, see Poterba and Von Hagen (1999) and Wyplosz (2012). For an extensive review on the types of 
rules and the main empirical evaluations of their impact, see IMF (2009). Balassone, Franco, and Zotteri (2004) 
review the literature on subnational fiscal rules in the European Union. As we focus on local governments, our 
results are particularly relevant for the literature that has emphasized that the implementation of subnational fis-
cal rules faces serious commitment problems, in the form of future overhaul, soft budget constraints, and lack of 
enforcement: see, among others, Eichengreen and von Hagen (1996); Braun and Tommasi (2004); Sutherland, 
Price, and Joumard (2005); and Ter-Minassian (2007). Feld and Kirchgäessner (2008) discuss the effects of the 
Swiss debt brakes, a type of fiscal rule, on cantons’ fiscal discipline. 
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as the United States (see Poterba 1994; 1996).9 While some studies find that fiscal 
rules do indeed result in lower budget imbalances, others stress the reasons why they 
might not be effective (see Alesina and Perotti 1999). We contribute to this literature 
by analyzing the effectiveness of fiscal restraints with a quasi-experimental design 
where we control for omitted factors that may affect previous results, such as the 
fact that more disciplined constituencies introduce tighter rules, or that (current and 
past) legal institutions are endogenous to cultural values.10
Secondly, we contribute to the large literature on the political economy of deficit 
determination, as we identify a set of politicians’ and voters’ characteristics associ-
ated with a larger deficit response when the rules are relaxed.11 From a normative 
perspective, the optimality of fiscal rules is not obvious. Fiscal rules are not optimal 
in a frictionless world, but they might become optimal when deficits are the subopti-
mal result of the interplay between rational politicians, voters, and interest groups.12
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes the Italian institutions. 
Section II lays out our identification strategy. Section III describes the data. 
Section IV discusses the empirical results. We conclude with Section V.
I. Institutional Framework
Fiscal rules can be applied either by national governments or by local govern-
ments. Both national and subnational rules can be either self-imposed or imposed 
by an external authority. For instance, the European Stability Pact is imposed by the 
European Union to the members states. The fiscal rules imposed on US states are 
instead self-imposed. There are three ways through which laws can achieve fiscal 
discipline: (i) delegation to an agent; (ii) binding numerical rules; and (iii) improv-
ing budgetary process (Wyplosz 2012). It appears that our results are more likely to 
generalize for numerical fiscal rules that are imposed by a national government on 
municipalities.
The Italian municipal government (comune) is composed of a mayor (sindaco), 
an executive committee (Giunta) appointed by the mayor, and an elected city 
council (consiglio comunale) that must endorse the annual budget proposed by 
the mayor. The mayor and the executive committee—whose members can be dis-
missed by the mayor at will—propose changes in fiscal policy, such as adjustments 
in the tax rates. Subsequently, the city council votes on the proposed changes. Since 
1993, mayors have been directly elected (with single round plurality rule in cities 
below 15,000 inhabitants) and face a two-term limit. Municipalities manage about 
9 Studies on the United States also include Von Hagen (1991), Alt and Lowry (1994), Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1995), Bohn and Inman (1996), Alesina and Bayoumi (1996), Knight (2000), Auerbach (2006), Clemens (2012), 
and Clemens and Miran (2012). 
10 On the endogenous determination of laws, see Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi (2004) and Givati and Troiano 
(2012). From a theoretical perspective, other authors analyze the welfare effect of fiscal restraints: Besley and Smart 
(2007) study limits on the size of government in a two-period agency model; Bassetto and Sargent (2006) study the 
welfare case for allowing the government to issue debt only to finance certain expenditures. 
11 This literature has been reviewed by Alesina and Perotti (1999). 
12 This is consistent with the aforementioned Alesina and Tabellini (1990); Persson and Svensson (1989); 
Aghion and Bolton (1990); Besley (2007); Battaglini and Coate (2008); and Song, Soresletten, and Zilibotti 
(2012). Other political economy models on deficit determination include Tabellini and Alesina (1990); Lizzeri 
(1999); Besley (2007); Azzimonti, Battaglini, and Coate (2010); and Yared (2010). 
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10  percent of total public expenditure and are in charge of a wide range of services, 
including water supply, waste management, municipal police, infrastructures, wel-
fare, and housing. Only about 20 percent of revenues are local revenues.
After the European Union adopted its Stability and Growth Pact in 1997, some 
European countries—including Italy—adopted subnational fiscal rules to keep local 
governments accountable. In December 1998, the Italian annual budget law (Legge 
Finanziaria) for 1999 introduced a set of rules that constrained all municipalities in 
terms of fiscal discipline, the aforementioned Domestic Stability Pact or DSP (patto 
di stabilità Interno).13
Municipal governments were constrained to keep the growth of their fiscal gap—
defined as deficit, net of transfers, and debt service—under tight control. The ratio-
nale for the exclusion of debt service and transfers in the definition of the DSP target 
is twofold. First, mayors are not held accountable for expenses on interest (which 
depend on previously contracted loans) and for revenues from transfers (which are 
not raised by the municipality). Second, these two items are the tools that the central 
government uses to enforce fiscal rules, reducing interest payments for compliers 
and cutting transfers for noncompliers. The punishment established for not comply-
ing with the DSP included the following penalties: (i) 5 percent cut in the annual 
transfers from the central government; (ii) ban on municipal hires; and (iii) 30 per-
cent cut on reimbursement and non-absenteeism bonuses for the employees of the 
municipal administration. Cities complying with the DSP, instead, benefited from a 
reduction of the expenses on interests for loans from the central government.14
The exact DSP rule constraining the fiscal gap changed from one year to another, 
but over our sample period it consisted in imposing a cap on the growth rate of the 
gap. Table 1 summarizes the evolution of the DSP over our sample period. The cap 
varies between a minimum of zero (no growth allowed) and a maximum of 3 per-
cent, the benchmark being the fiscal gap two years before the actual budget year 
(this means that, for instance, the growth rate in 2004 is calculated with respect to 
the fiscal gap in 2002). Therefore our estimates will refer to the effects of a fiscal 
rule that allows deficits to grow rather than to stand still.
In evaluating the impact of the DSP on fiscal discipline, we therefore focus on the 
pattern of both deficit and fiscal gap. Constrained and unconstrained municipalities 
can accumulate debt, but if they run into fiscal distress they need to go through a 
special procedure of budget consolidation (piano di risanamento). One possible 
concern can be that relaxing fiscal rules induces expectations in our treated cities that 
they will be bailed out in case of situations of fiscal distress.15 While we acknowl-
edge the possibility that changes in fiscal restraints can always be confounded with 
changes in expectations, both legal and anecdotal evidence are consistent with the 
13 See Law 23 December 1998, no. 448, article 28. 
14 In line with the law, we compute the fiscal gap with the formula: Fiscal Gap = (Total Expenditures − Debt 
Service) − (Total Revenues − Transfers). See online Appendix Table A1 for more details on the definition of pol-
icy outcomes. Unfortunately, the Ministry of the Interior does not release the list of municipalities that did not 
comply with the rule according to its records. As discussed in Section A, we find suggestive evidence that the DSP 
penalties were to some extent enforced, as there is a correlation between noncompliance (as estimated in our data) 
and lower transfers (which are the main DSP enforcement mechanism). 
15 Italian cities can finance their debt through the emission of bonds (Buoni obbligazionari comunali), or with 
loans from a central administrative agency (cassa depositi e prestiti), and from private banks. 
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view that the Italian government made a substantial effort to keep expectations of 
bailouts as low as possible in the period of interest. In 2001, the Italian Constitution 
was revised to introduce a higher degree of fiscal decentralization while making 
bailouts unconstitutional.16
After 2001, all municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants were exempted by the 
DSP.17 The motivation for this exemption was not made explicit by the central 
government, but it is probably linked to the goal of providing some relief to small 
municipalities in the presence of economies of scale in managing the municipal 
government.
Fiscal rules, however, are not the only policy varying with population size at 
5,000. In particular, at this cutoff, there is a sharp increase in the wage received by the 
mayor and by the other members of the executive committee, based on a remunera-
tion policy that has been in place since the early 1960s. Gagliarducci and Nannicini 
(2013) show that the wage increase at 5,000 attracts more educated individuals into 
politics and improves their performance once elected. Table 2 summarizes all the 
Italian policies on municipal governments relying on population thresholds over 
our sample period. Population size determines the size of the city council; the size 
of the executive committee; the electoral rule; and whether a municipality can have 
additional elective bodies at the neighborhood level. But only the DSP (after 2001) 
and the salary of local politicians display a discontinuity at the 5,000 threshold.
In 2002, regions with special autonomy (regioni a statuto speciale) were allowed 
to set their own fiscal rules for municipal governments, and this is why we do not 
consider these regions in our study. Furthermore, since 2005 fiscal rules have been 
frequently changing from one year to another, shifting the population cutoff from 
16 The new article 119 of the Italian Constitution specifically forbids the increase of governmental transfers 
to local governments in fiscal distress. Anecdotal evidence confirms a hard-line stance by the central government 
toward indebted municipalities. For instance, Taranto, a medium-sized Italian city, declared bankruptcy in 2006; 
local newspapers reporting on the fiscal situation of the city (e.g., see Taranto sera) stressed how the city had to 
undertake a multiyear repayment plan, without any help from the central government, and, after six years, almost 
half of the debt was still outstanding; public services and wage of public employees were suspended for some 
months after the bankruptcy, and local tax rates were significantly raised. 
17 See Law 23 December 2000, no. 388, article 53. 
Table 1—Rules of the Domestic Stability Pact (DSP)
Year Target of the DSP rules Covered municipalities
1997 None All
1998 None All
1999 Fiscal gap: zero growth All
2000 Fiscal gap: zero growth All
2001 Fiscal gap: max 3 percent growth Above 5,000
2002 Fiscal gap: max 2.5 percent growth Above 5,000
2003 Fiscal gap: zero growth Above 5,000
2004 Fiscal gap: zero growth Above 5,000
notes: The Domestic Stability Pact is a set of fiscal rules imposed by the central government to 
discipline the fiscal management of local governments. The main target is the Fiscal gap (see 
online Appendix Table A1 for details). The growth of the fiscal gap with respect to its value 
two years before is constrained to be either 0 or below 2.5 percent/3 percent depending on the 
year of the DSP.
source: Annual national budget law (Legge Finanziaria) from 1999 to 2004
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5,000 to 3,000 and back, and replacing the fiscal gap requirement with expenditure 
caps in some years. This is the reason why we focus our empirical evaluation on the 
period from 1997 to 2004.
In the next section, we explain how we exploit our setting to identify the effect of 
fiscal restraints on fiscal discipline.
II. Econometric Framework
A. setup
Based on the institutional framework discussed above, two treatments sharply 
change at the relevant threshold: the wage of the mayor (and of the executive offi-
cers) and fiscal rules. Define  W it as the first treatment for municipality  i at time  t , 
equal to one if the wage is low and equal to zero otherwise; also define  r it as the 
second treatment, equal to one if fiscal rules are relaxed and equal to zero if they are 
still binding. Mayors of municipalities with population size ( p it ) below the thresh-
old  p c = 5,000 have a lower salary for every year of the sample period, while the 
relaxation of fiscal rules is introduced at time  t 0 for municipalities below the same 
threshold. Population size is measured by the last available census (Gagliarducci 
and Nannicini 2013, Calzolari et al. 2014). The assignment mechanism for both 
treatments can therefore be described as follows:
  W it =  { 1 if  p it <  p c   0 otherwise, 
  r it =  { 1 if  p it <  p c and t ≥  t 0    0 otherwise. 
Table 2—Legislative Thresholds for Italian Municipalities, 1997–2004
Wage of Wage of Size of Size of Electoral
Population mayor executive committee (%) executive committee city council rule
Below 1,000 1,291 15 4 12 Single
1,000–3,000 1,446 20 4 12 Single
3,000–5,000 2,169 20 4 16 Single
5,000–10,000 2,789 50 4 16 Single
10,000–15,000 3,099 55 6 20 Single
15,000–30,000 3,099 55 6 20 Runoff
30,000–50,000 3,460 55 6 30 Runoff
50,000–100,000 4,132 75 6 30 Runoff
100,000–250,000 5,010 75 10 40 Runoff
250,000–500,000 5,784 75 12 46 Runoff
Above 500,000 7,798 75 14–16 50–60 Runoff
notes: Policies varying at different legislative thresholds in the period 1999–2004. population is the number of res-
ident inhabitants as measured by the last available census. Wage of mayor and Wage of executive committee refer 
to the monthly gross wage of the mayor and the members of the executive committee, respectively; the latter is 
expressed as a percentage of the former, which refers to 2000 and is measured in euros. size of executive committee 
is the maximum allowed number of executives appointed by the mayor. size of city council is the number of seats in 
the city council. The wage thresholds at 1,000 and 10,000 were introduced in 2000; all of the other thresholds date 
back to 1960. Since 1993, the Electoral rule for the mayor is plurality with either single round or runoff.
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Define  Y it (w, r) as the potential policy outcomes if  W it = w and  r it = r , 
with  w = 0, 1 and  r = 0, 1 . The observed outcome is therefore equal to 
 Y it =  W it  r it Y it (1, 1) +  W it (1 −  r it ) Y it (1, 0) + (1 −  W it ) r it Y it (0, 1) + (1 −  W it )(1 −  r it ) Y it (0, 0) .
In this setting, we aim at identifying the causal effect of  r it on  Y it . Borrowing 
the notation from Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001), we define  Z − 
≡ li m p→ p c −  E [ Z it |  p it = p, t ≥  t 0 ] and  Z + ≡ li m p→ p c +  E [ Z it |  p it = p, t ≥  t 0 ], 
with  Z = Y, Y (1, 1), Y (1, 0), Y (0, 1), Y (0, 0) . Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw 
(2001) derive precise conditions under which the cross-sectional Regression 
Discontinuity (RD) estimator after  t 0 , defined as  τ ˆrd ≡  Y − −  Y + , would identify 
the average treatment effect of  r it at the threshold—i.e., for  p it =  p c —if fiscal rules 
were the only treatment sharply changing at  p c . In our setting, however, standard 
continuity conditions are not enough for identification, because of the confounding 
treatment  W it .
Even if we assume that all potential outcomes  E [ Y it (w, r) |  p it = p, t ≥  t 0 ] , with 
w = 0, 1 and  r = 0, 1 , are continuous in  p at  p c , we have that
  τ ˆrd ≡  Y − −  Y + = Y (1, 1) − − Y (0, 0) + 
 = [Y (1, 1) − − Y (1, 0) − ] + [Y (1, 0) + − Y (0, 0) + ] 
 = E [Y (1, 1) it − Y (1, 0) it |  p it =  p c , t ≥  t 0 ] 
 + E [Y (1, 0) it − Y (0, 0) it |  p it =  p c , t ≥  t 0 ] ,  
where the first term in the right-hand side captures one of the potential causal effects 
of interest (namely, the average treatment effect of relaxing fiscal rules in cities 
where mayors are poorly paid) and the second term captures a “selection bias” 
(namely, the average treatment effect of reducing mayors’ wage in cities where fis-
cal rules are binding).18 As a result, the cross-sectional RD estimator provides a 
biased estimate of the average treatment effect of relaxing fiscal rules in a neigh-
borhood of the threshold, because the effects of the two (confounded) treatments 
cannot be disentangled between each other.
B. Identification and diagnostics
We now show how to overcome the identification problem discussed above. 
Information on the pretreatment period ( t <  t 0 ) allows us to remove the selec-
tion bias under local assumptions. Analogously to the posttreatment period, for 
the pretreatment period we define:  Z ̃− ≡ li m p→ p c −  E [ Z it |  p it = p, t <  t 0 ]  and  Z ̃+ ≡ li m p→ p c +  E [ Z it |  p it = p, t <  t 0 ], with  Z = Y, Y (1, 1), Y (1, 0), Y (0, 1), Y (0, 0) . 
18 Obviously, the fact that we refer to the second term as “selection bias” is just a matter of convention, as we 
are after the treatment effect of relaxing fiscal rules. As a matter of fact, both terms are average treatment effects of 
two (confounded) policies. 
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To identify the causal effect of relaxing fiscal rules, we exploit both the discontinu-
ous variation at  p c and the time variation after  t 0 :
  τ ˆdd ≡ ( Y − −  Y + ) −  ( Y ̃− −  Y ̃+ ) .
We call  τ ˆdd “difference-in-discontinuities” estimator (shortly, “diff-in-disc”), 
because it rests on the intuition of combining a difference-in-differences strategy 
and an RD design.
Alternative approaches in the literature have exploited the longitudinal 
nature of the data in an RD framework, such as the fixed-effect RD estimator in 
Pettersson-Lidbom (2012), the first-difference RD estimator in Lemieux and Milli-
gan (2008), or the dynamic RD design in Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein (2010). 
All of these estimators, however, are different from ours. In their setups, treatment 
assignment changes over time and identification rests on within-unit variation, 
while in our case identification rests on the difference between two cross-sectional 
estimators. We are aware that other empirical studies have already implemented 
what we call diff-in-disc design, but we now provide precise identification assump-
tions for this approach and propose diagnostics tools that directly stem from these 
assumptions.19
ASSUMPTION 1: All potential outcomes  E [ Y it (w, r) |  p it = p, t ≥  t 0 ] and 
 E [ Y it (w, r) |  p it = p, t <  t 0 ] , with  w = 0, 1 and  r = 0, 1 , are continuous in 
 p at  p c .
ASSUMPTION 2: The effect of the confounding policy  W it at  p c , in the case of 
no treatment , ( r it = 0 ) is constant over time:  Y (1, 0) − Y (0, 0) =  Y ̃(1, 0) −  Y ̃(0, 0) .20
Assumption 2 requires the effect of the confounding policy discontinuity  W it at 
p c not to vary with time. In other words, it requires observations just below and just 
above  p c to be on a (local) parallel trend in the absence of the new policy  r it . This 
is similar to the standard identifying assumption for difference-in-differences but 
is more local, as it must be met only in a neighborhood of the policy threshold.21 
To indirectly test for this assumption, in Section IV, we estimate the pattern of the 
discontinuities in  Y it before  t 0 and show that observations just below and just above 
p c were not on differential trends before the policy shift. Another test to validate the 
19 For examples of diff-in-disc designs, see Lalive (2008), Campa (2011), Leonardi and Pica (2013), and 
Casas-Arce and Saiz (2015). Our econometric strategy also relates to evaluation designs that exploit the comparison 
between different discontinuities across space, such as in different US states (see Dickert-Conlin and Elder 2010) 
or for politicians facing different term limits (see Gagliarducci and Nannicini 2013). 
20 Note that, because of Assumption 1, we can now write:  Z + =  Z − ≡ Z and  Z ̃+ =  Z ̃− ≡  Z ̃, with 
 Z = Y, Y (1, 1), Y (1, 0), Y (0, 1), Y (0, 0) . 
21 Indeed, in our empirical setting, the difference-in-differences assumption of parallel trend in the all sample is 
unlikely to be satisfied (see the evidence discussed in the next section). 
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plausibility of this assumption coincides with checking whether any manipulation 
of the running variable changes (or arises) over time.22
It is easy to show that, under the above assumptions, the diff-in-disc estimator 
identifies the (local) causal effect of relaxing fiscal rules ( r it ) in a neighborhood of 
the threshold ( p it =  p c ) and for cities where politicians’ wages are low ( W it = 1 ).
PROPOSITION 1: under Assumption 1 and Assumption 2, the diff-in-disc estima-
tor  τ ˆdd identifies the average treatment effect:  E [ Y it (1, 1) −  Y it (1, 0) |  p it =  p c ] .
PROOF: 
   τ ˆdd ≡ ( Y − −  Y + ) − ( Y ̃− −  Y ̃+ ) = [Y (1, 1) − − Y (0, 0) + ] 
 − [ Y ̃(1, 0) − −  Y ̃(0, 0) + ] = Y (1, 1) − Y (0, 0) − Y (1, 0) + Y (0, 0) 
 = Y (1, 1) − Y (1, 0) = E [ Y it (1, 1) −  Y it (1, 0) |  p it =  p c ] . ∎
This result allows us to identify a causal effect of the treatment of interest under 
plausible conditions. Yet, the estimand only refers to cities with poorly paid may-
ors (that is, to cities that also receive the confounding treatment). To identify a 
more general estimand with the diff-in-disc estimator, we need to make a further 
assumption.
ASSUMPTION 3: The effect of the treatment  r it at  p c does not depend on the con-
founding policy  W it :  Y (1, 1) − Y (1, 0) = Y (0, 1) − Y (0, 0) ≡ Y (1) − Y (0) .
It is straightforward to extend the result in Proposition 1 and show that, under the 
above assumption, the diff-in-disc estimator identifies the (local) causal effect of 
relaxing fiscal rules in a neighborhood of the threshold, that is, the standard estimand 
in RD designs:  E [ Y it (1, 1) −  Y it (1, 0) | p =  p c ] = E [ Y it (0, 1) −  Y it (0, 0) | p = 
p c ] ≡ E [ Y it (1) −  Y it (0) | p =  p c ] .
This third (homogeneity) assumption states that there must be no interaction 
between the treatment and the confounding policy. In our institutional setting, 
this assumption would be violated if mayors just below and just above  p c , who 
are paid differently, reacted to the relaxation of fiscal rules in different ways. In 
Section IV, under the maintained hypothesis that Assumption 2 holds, we directly 
test Assumption 3 exploiting the introduction of fiscal rules for all municipalities in 
1999. In fact, if Assumption 3 were satisfied, a falsification test implementing the 
diff-in-disc estimator in 1999 would deliver a zero effect.
22 Specifically, in Section IV, we extend the cross-sectional test of continuity of the density at  p c (see McCrary 
2008) to test for the continuity of the difference in the densities before and after  t 0 . We also implement diff-in-disc 
estimations with time-invariant characteristics as outcomes, so as to indirectly test for changes in the pattern of 
manipulative sorting. As a further check in this direction, we include time-invariant characteristics and year fixed 
effects as covariates in the baseline diff-in-disc estimations; in the absence of manipulative sorting, point estimates 
are expected to remain similar and accuracy to increase. 
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Finally, note that—based on the institutions described in the previous section—
our diff-in-disc design can only identify the effect of relaxing fiscal rules for small 
Italian municipalities. Therefore, interpreting our estimates as the effect of imposing 
fiscal rules in the same setting would require an additional symmetry assumption.
C. Estimation
The diff-in-disc estimator can be implemented by estimating the boundary points 
of four regression functions of  Y it on  p it : two on both sides of  p c , both before and 
after  t 0 . We apply a local linear regression, following Gelman and Imbens (2014).23 
The method consists in fitting linear regression functions to the observations distrib-
uted within a distance  h on either side of  p c , both before and after  t 0 . Formally, we 
restrict the sample to cities in the interval  p it ∈ [ p c − h,  p c + h] and estimate the 
model
(1)  Y it =  δ 0 +  δ 1  p it ∗ +  s i ( γ 0 +  γ 1  p it ∗) +  T t [ α 0 
 +  α 1  p it ∗ +  s i ( β 0 +  β 1  p it ∗)] +  ξ it ,
where  s i is a dummy for cities below 5,000 capturing treatment status,  T t an indica-
tor for the posttreatment period, and  p it ∗ =  p it −  p c the normalized population size. 
Standard errors are clustered at the city level. The coefficient  β 0 is the diff-in-disc 
estimator and identifies the treatment effect of relaxing fiscal rules, as the treatment 
is  r it =  s i ·  T t . We present the robustness of our results to multiple bandwidths  h , 
optimally computed first following the algorithm developed by Calonico, Cattaneo, 
and Titiunik (2014a, b), and then implementing the cross-validation method pro-
posed by Ludwig and Miller (2007).24
III. Data
We use administrative data from the Italian Ministry of the Interior (ministero 
dell’Interno) containing information at the municipality level on the universe of 
municipal financial reports, municipal tax rates, electoral outcomes, and individual 
characteristics of the mayor. Based on the local nature of our diff-in-disc design, we 
restrict the sample to Italian municipalities between 3,500 and 7,000 inhabitants.25 
23 See also Imbens and Lemieux (2008), Van der Klaauw (2008), and Lee and Lemieux (2010). 
24 In a previous working paper version of the paper (Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano 2012), we show that our 
estimates are robust if we adopt a spline polynomial approximation. That method uses all observations and chooses 
a flexible functional form to fit the relationship between  Y it and  p it on either side of  p c , both before and after  t 0 :
(2)  Y it =  ∑ 
k=0
q
  ( δ k  p it ∗k ) +  s i  ∑ 
k=0
q
  ( γ k  p it ∗k ) +  T t  [ ∑ k=0
q
  ( α k  p it ∗k ) +  s i  ∑ 
k=0
q
  ( β k  p it ∗k ) ] +  ξ it ,
where  β 0 is again the diff-in-disc estimator identifying the treatment effect of relaxing fiscal rules. 
25 We restrict the sample to the interval 3,500–7,000 to stay relatively far from the 3,000 threshold, where other 
policies change (see Table 2), and to balance the sample size on either side of the 5,000 threshold. All the results 
are robust to this interval choice, i.e., they are virtually unchanged for alternative choices, such as 3,250–6,750; 
3,000–7,000; 3,500–6,500; 4,000–6,000; and 3,500–7,500. 
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For the reason discussed in Section I, we drop municipalities in regions with special 
autonomy. This leaves us with a final sample of 1,050 municipalities for a total of 
6,300 observations from 1999 to 2004. Among them, 555 municipalities are treated 
after 2001 and 495 are in the control group. Our sample contains about 13 percent of 
all Italian municipalities and about 8 percent of the national population.
The population size comes either from the 1991 or from the 2001 census. Because 
the relaxation of the DSP was decided in December 2000, it is very unlikely that 
municipalities had the time to influence their census population and sort below the 
5,000 threshold, and it is also unlikely that elected officials wanted to do that at the 
price of cutting their wage. In Section B, we formally test for manipulative sorting 
below 5,000 before/after 2001 by comparing population size in the 1991 and 2001 
census.
The main variables of interest are the municipal financial report’s categories. To 
measure fiscal discipline, we evaluate the deficit (total expenditures minus total rev-
enues) and the fiscal gap (total expenditures minus total revenues, net of transfers, 
and debt service), which is the target of the DSP. We divide expenditures into current 
outlays (including personnel expenditure), capital outlays (mostly investments), and 
debt service; and we divide revenues into municipal taxes, fees and tariffs, transfers 
from the central government, and other revenues. The main tax instruments decided 
by municipal governments are the real estate tax rate on home property (ICI), pro-
viding about 50 percent of their tax revenues, and the municipal surcharge on the 
personal income tax (IRPEF), amounting to about 10 percent of tax revenues.26 See 
the online Appendix Table A1 for precise definitions and data sources of all vari-
ables from the municipal financial reports.
One possible concern in evaluating the reaction of policies and tax instruments 
to fiscal rules might be that mayors have very little autonomy in adjusting local 
revenues or expenditure, but this is not the case for Italian municipalities. On the 
revenues side, over our sample period, mayors could vary ICI within a bracket from 
0.4 to 0.7 percent of the legal home value, and the IRPEF surcharge within a bracket 
from 0 to 0.5 percent of taxable income.27 And they were also free to set other local 
taxes (such as those on building rights or the occupation of public areas) or fees 
and tariffs for the services they provided (such as waste management or child care). 
Additionally, Italian towns are characterized by a sizable level of tax evasion, which 
the mayor can decide to fight.28
On the expenditure side, municipalities also have room for adjustment because 
about one-third of expenditures are classified as not rigid (that is, not attributable 
to payroll expenses and debt service). For instance, one way to reduce expendi-
tures without affecting the level of services is outsourcing (e.g., child care provided 
by private firms with more labor flexibility and lower costs although the financing 
26 Bordignon, Nannicini, and Tabellini (2013) also use ICI as the main policy tool of Italian municipalities. 
27 One additional concern can be that mayors comply with the rule by simply manipulating legal home value. 
However, legal home value is not determined or updated by mayors, as indicated by the dpr 22 December 1986, 
no. 917. Only in 2005, not in our sample, the Law 23 December 2005, no. 266 gave to municipalities some weak 
power of requesting the update of the assessed value of the real estate tax base. 
28 Casaburi and Troiano (2016) find that in 2007 over 2 million Italian buildings were not registered in the 
cadastral maps and thus were not part of the tax base for real estate and income tax. 
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remains public). Furthermore, Bandiera, Prat, and Valletti (2009) show how similar 
Italian municipalities can pay very differently for similar goods, and they interpret 
this as evidence of passive waste. This implies that, even if all current expenditures 
were rigid (and this is certainly not the case), mayors would still have the ability to 
reduce passive waste in order to adjust the fiscal gap.
Our dataset also contains time-invariant information on each municipality (geo-
graphic location, area size in km2, sea level in meters), as well as time-varying 
information on the elected mayor (age, years of schooling, tenure in office, term 
limit), on the socioeconomic environment (taxable income of resident inhabitants, 
age structure of the population), and on the political environment (number of polit-
ical parties in the city council).
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics on the main outcome variables (policy out-
comes and tax instruments) for cities below and above 5,000 inhabitants. All vari-
ables are per capita and expressed in real terms (with 2009 as base year); tax rates 
are in percentage points. Municipalities below (above) 5,000 manage an annual 
budget equal to almost 1,041 (943) euros per capita in terms of expenditures, and the 
deficit amounts to about 15 (11) euros. Taxes are only slightly lower than 20 percent 
of total revenues and higher in municipalities above 5,000. The main tax rates on 
ICI and the IRPEF surcharge, however, are fairly similar for municipalities in the 
two groups. Please note that transfers amount to about 200 euro per capita, which is 
close to the difference between deficit and fiscal gap.
As a benchmark, note that applying a difference-in-differences strategy to our 
dataset delivers the expected result: relaxing fiscal rules increases the deficit by 
6.276 euros per capita and the fiscal gap by 48.278 euros per capita in a  specification 
Table 3—Outcome Variables, Descriptive Statistics
Municipalities Municipalities
above 5,000 below 5,000
panel A. Fiscal discipline
Deficit 11.080 15.457
Fiscal gap 170.724 208.624
panel B. Expenditures
Current outlays 475.312 502.181
Capital outlays 438.838 508.794
Debt service 29.139 30.107
panel c. revenues
Taxes 194.887 175.825
Fees and tariffs 56.601 58.938
Central transfers 188.783 223.274
Other revenues 491.938 567.589
panel d. Tax instruments
Real estate tax rate 0.587 0.576
Income tax surcharge 0.309 0.309
Observations 2,970 3,330
notes: Municipalities between 3,500 and 7,000 inhabitants; budget years between 1999 and 
2004. The average values of per capita policy outcomes are in 2009 euros. The real estate tax 
rate and the income tax surcharge are in percentage points; the former can vary from 0.4 to 
0.7 percent; the latter can vary from 0 to 0.5 percent.
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without municipality fixed effects, and by 5.279 and 16.669 with fixed effects, 
where both estimates on deficit are statistically significant at a 5 percent level and 
those on the fiscal gap at a 1 percent level (see Table A2). Those coefficients should 
be interpreted with caution, because their identification relies on assuming that 
small cities are a good counterfactual for larger cities. This is a strong assump-
tion, which is violated in our setting because population affects the trends, and 
not only the levels, of public policies. In online Appendix Figure A1 we show that 
in a  difference-in- differences design the parallel pre-trends assumption is violated 
for four of our budget items (capital expenditures, taxes, other revenues, and fees 
and transfers).
In the next section, we discuss the results of the diff-in-disc design.
IV. Empirical Results
A. Effect of relaxing Fiscal rules on policy outcomes
Table 4 contains the main (diff-in-disc) estimation results. The main outcomes 
of interest are the two measures of fiscal discipline: deficit and fiscal gap. While the 
latter is the main target of the DSP, we believe that the former should be the real 
variable of policy interest. For each outcome variable, we present our baseline local 
linear regression estimates as in equation (1), with two different types of optimal 
bandwidth.29
The impact of relaxing rules on the deficit is positive and significant both in sta-
tistical and in economic terms. The DSP relaxation increases the deficit by about 
20 euros per capita with respect to a baseline situation of balanced budget. The 
deficit created by the relaxation of the DSP is also substantial from an economic 
point of view, as it amounts to about 2 percent of total expenditures. This effect is 
driven by a higher fiscal gap of about 30 percent. Both these effects are statistically 
significant at standard levels in all specifications, while the point estimates seem to 
depend from the selected bandwidth. The relatively large difference between the 
coefficient on the deficit and on the fiscal gap is mainly explained by a difference in 
transfers, which is consistent, as discussed below, with the possibility that noncom-
pliant municipalities subject to the DSP receive lower transfers.
These estimation results on fiscal discipline are consistent with the descriptive 
graphs shown in Figure 1 where we draw scatters and polynomial fits of the dif-
ferences between each post-2001 outcome value and each pre-2001 value. These 
graphs allow us to see whether those differences exhibit a discontinuity at the 5,000 
threshold. We see that both variables measuring fiscal discipline exhibit a sharp 
jump when moving from the left to the right of the threshold in the whole sample. 
Furthermore, in the top graphs of Figure 2, we shed some light on the timing of the 
effect to provide evidence that high and low paid mayors were on parallel trends 
29 Optimal bandwidths are calculated as either in Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014a, b) or in Ludwig and 
Miller (2007). Results are robust to the use of predetermined bandwidths (i.e., 250, 500, 750, and 1,000) or spline 
polynomial with different orders (i.e., third and fifth). In a previous version of the paper, Grembi, Nannicini and 
Troiano (2012), we presented the results for the spline third- and fourth-order polynomials. 
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around the neighborhood of the 5,000 threshold.30 The evidence is consistent for 
both deficit and fiscal gap, as there is a change in the slope of the coefficients only 
after 2001. Most importantly, the cross-sectional RD estimates in 1999 and 2000 
show that cities just below and just above 5,000 were on parallel trends before the 
policy shift. The fact that the timing of change is sharper for fiscal gap than for defi-
cit could potentially be explained by the enforcement of the law through penalties. 
This robustness check also indirectly suggests that our policy was not anticipated in 
previous years.
30 The preexisting discontinuities are consistent with the results of Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013), who find 
that low paid mayors are more likely to engage in redistribution, which appears to be financed with both higher 
deficits and attracting more transfers. 
Table 4—Effect of Relaxing Fiscal Rules, Diff-in-Disc Estimates
Current Capital Debt
Deficit Fiscal gap outlays outlays service
panel A: Fiscal discipline and expenditures
Calonico et al. (2014) 17.495 59.468 −47.698 102.557 −2.607
(7.737) (32.079) (59.522) (101.152) (8.057)
 h 600 513 443 427 404
Observations 2,414 2,136 1,828 1,724 1,646
Cross validation 9.454 48.469 −10.665 −4.221 −2.096
(4.343) (23.315) (32.756) (83.336) (3.587)
 h 1,498 833 979 944 1,202
Observations 5,858 3,438 4,112 3,974 4,908
mean 13.393 190.757 489.515 475.815 29.651
Fees and Central Other Real estate Income tax
Taxes tariffs transfers revenues tax rate surcharge
panel B: revenues and tax instruments
Calonico et al. (2014) −76.083 −2.879 35.001 −21.900 −0.050 −0.070
(32.597) (10.140) (27.634) (120.248) (0.026) (0.039)
 h 378 505 564 399 435 441
Observations 1,536 2,104 2,286 1,622 1,782 1,310
Cross validation −34.748 1.413 32.938 −81.308 −0.027 −0.044
(20.166) (7.199) (21.721) (62.926) (0.016) (0.026)
 h 684 795 833 1,498 907 871
Observations 2,810 3,238 3,438 5,858 3,806 2,594
mean 184.811 57.836 207.014 531.925 0.581 0.309
notes: Municipalities between 3,500 and 7,000 inhabitants; budget years between 1999 and 2004.  Diff-in-disc 
estimates of the impact of relaxing fiscal rules on policy outcomes and tax instruments below 5,000 after 
2001. Estimation method: local linear regression with two optimal bandwidth h, as in equation (1). The opti-
mal bandwidth h is estimated either following Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014a, b), or implementing the 
cross-validation algorithm proposed by Ludwig and Miller (2007). All policy outcomes are per capita and in 
2009 euros.
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It should be noted that the magnitude of our effects is sensitive to the bandwidth 
chosen, as can be seen in the two graphs plotted at the bottom of Figure 2 (pan-
els C and D). If one interprets bandwidth choice as a tradeoff between accuracy 
and consistency (with smaller bandwidths reducing the precision of the estimates 
but also removing selection bias), it is instructive to note that smaller bandwidths 
are associated with both larger confidence intervals, as expected, and larger point 
estimates, accordingly with the expected direction of the bias. It should be noted that 
the  difference-in-differences estimates are closer to the diff-in-disc ones with larger 
bandwidths, and that the statistical significance is lost at a bandwidth of a population 
size of about 1,000 inhabitants for fiscal gap and is never lost for deficit.
One of the advantages of our setting is the availability of homogeneous financial 
reports about the policies the Italian municipalities, and the availability of adminis-
trative data about tax rates. In the last three columns of panel A, Table 4, we begin 
investigating the composition of the fiscal adjustment and we consider the expendi-
tures side. We find that the coefficient on the expenditures variables are not statisti-
cally different from zero, although the large standard errors don’t allow drawing a 
definite conclusion. However, it is reassuring to note that the graphical evidence in 
both Figures 3 and 4 suggests that the large standard errors may be due to outliers, 
and that no sizable discontinuities are detected in the expenditures outcomes via 
visual inspection, with the exclusion of the debt service (whose point estimate is, 
however, not statistically different from zero in Table 4, probably because of the 
different choice of the bandwidth and control function).
In panel B, we find that tax revenues are lower by about 20 to 45 percent in 
unconstrained municipalities. Lower tax revenues are the result of lower tax rates 
decided by the municipal government (see panel B of Table 4). Cities for which 
fiscal rules are relaxed have a 14 percent lower real estate tax rate and a 30 percent 
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Figure 1. Difference-in-Discontinuities for Deficit and Fiscal Gap (1)
Notes: Vertical axis: difference of each post-rule (i.e., 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004) outcome value and each  pre-rule 
(i.e., 1999 and 2000) outcome value. Horizontal axis: actual population size minus 5,000. The central line is a spline 
third-order polynomial fit; the lateral lines represent the 95 percent confidence interval. Scatter points are averaged 
over intervals of 50 inhabitants.
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lower income tax surcharge. Other revenues do not seem to be affected by the relax-
ation of fiscal restraints.31 In Figure 5, we confirm that the (local) parallel trend 
assumption is also satisfied for all our other financial report items.32
Also on the side of revenues, central transfers seem to be higher for uncon-
strained municipalities, although point estimates are not statistically significant. 
The large standard errors do not allow us to draw a definitive conclusion about the 
effect of relaxing the restraints on transfers. However, even if transfers increased as 
a result of the relaxation of the restraint, that result would not be able to explain the 
above impact of relaxing fiscal rules on fiscal discipline, because it would go in the 
opposite direction (that is, local governments running higher deficits receive larger 
transfers), and it would be consistent with the design of the law, which allows the 
central government to cut transfers as an enforcement mechanism. This  conjecture 
31 Other revenues include transfers from the European Union, other transfers, mortgages from administrative 
agencies, revenues coming from private properties owned by the municipality. Even if the standard errors for other 
revenues are bigger than the rest of our variables, visual inspection of the corresponding graph in Figure 3 reveals 
that standard errors are driven up by an outlier in this category. Repeating our analysis without this outlier consis-
tently reduces the standard errors without affecting the other outcomes. 
32 We also investigate how the relaxation of the restraint affects total revenues and total expenditures. We don’t 
detect a statistically significant effect on total revenues and total expenditures. 
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Figure 2. Difference-in-Discontinuities for Deficit and Fiscal Gap (2)
notes: Top graphs: yearly RD coefficients. Vertical axis: point estimates of local linear regressions with opti-
mal bandwidth computed following Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014a, b). Horizontal axis: year. The 
central line is the point estimate; the lateral lines represent the 95 percent confidence interval. Bottom graphs: 
 difference-in-discontinuities. Vertical axis: diff-in-disc coefficients. Horizontal axis: bandwidth used to estimate the 
reported diff-in-disc coefficients.
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is consistent with our data. Although the Italian government did not release the 
official list of complying and noncomplying municipalities, we can estimate com-
pliance status in every year by applying the official rule summarized in Table 1 
to our data. We find that complying municipalities amount to 68 percent of the 
total, and noncomplying municipalities are also present around the 5,000 threshold, 
where the estimated compliance status shows a sharp discontinuity of about 40 per-
cent.33 Future transfers appear to be strongly correlated with compliance status: in 
a specification that controls for municipality and year fixed effects, central transfers 
are larger by about 10.329 euros per capita (standard error, 3.303) for complying 
municipalities. This evidence is consistent with the institutional details discussed 
in Section I, according to which central transfers are used as the main enforcement 
device of the DSP. Consistent with the estimation results, tax revenues, ICI, and 
IRPEF show significant and negative jumps moving from just above to just below 
the 5,000 residents threshold.
33 Specifically, if we repeat our RD estimations using compliance status as a dependent variable, we obtain the 
following results for the local linear regression and the spline polynomial approximation specifications, respec-
tively: 0.450 (standard error, 0.070); 0.443 (0.054); 0.448 (0.076); 0.436 (0.096). 
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Figure 3. Difference-in-Discontinuities for Revenues Outcomes
notes: Difference-in-discontinuities. Vertical axis: difference of each post-rule (i.e., 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004) 
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B. Validity Tests
As discussed in Section II, the above estimation results rest on Assumption 1 
and Assumption 2 for the identification of different average treatment effects in the 
neighborhood of the population threshold. In this section, we indirectly evaluate 
Assumption 1 by means of testing procedures aimed at detecting changes in manip-
ulative sorting before/after 2001, and we directly test Assumption 2 in a falsifica-
tion test that uses pretreatment data.
In online Appendix Figure A2, we test the null hypothesis of continuity of the 
difference in the density at 5,000 between the 1991 and the 2001 census (top graph), 
by drawing both scatters and (third-order) polynomial fits. If mayors were able to 
manipulate population size and sort below the threshold to avoid fiscal rules, our 
estimates would still suffer from the selection bias that was common in the previous 
empirical literature. However, in principle, there is very little room for differen-
tial manipulation between the two censuses, because (i) the DSP is only enacted 
in December 2000; (ii) the census is run independently by the National Statistical 
Office, so that false reporting should be ruled out; and (iii) mayors willing to sort 
below 5,000 to enjoy a relaxation of fiscal rules would pay the price of cutting 
their wage. Nevertheless, it might still be the case that some municipalities under 
financial stress tried to sort below 5,000 moving from the 1991 to the 2001 census, 
by forcing some residents to leave or (more plausibly) not counter-reacting to pop-
ulation drops. Yet, the top graph in Figure A1 is reassuring about the absence of 
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 manipulation, as there is no jump in the difference between the two densities. The 
point estimate from the spline polynomial approximation is equal to −0.078 (stan-
dard error, 0.114), and therefore is not statistically different from zero. For the sake 
of completeness, we also report the cross-sectional density tests for 1991 (bottom 
left) and 2001 (bottom right). Also there, there is no evidence of manipulation.34
Furthermore, in the online Appendix Table A3, we check for the balancing of 
time-invariant characteristics by including covariates, together with year fixed 
effects, in the baseline diff-in-disc estimations; as expected, point estimates remain 
almost unchanged and accuracy increases. The online Appendix Table A4 further 
evaluates the absence of manipulation. We implement diff-in-disc estimations with 
time-invariant characteristics (geographic location, area size, and sea level) as out-
come variables, but we use changing population numbers: the 1991 census before 
the treatment year, and the 2001 census afterward. This is meant to assess whether 
the fraction of cities with certain fixed characteristics just below or above 5,000 
varies from 1991 to 2001. No time-invariant characteristics display a statistically 
significant jump. We think that geographical location is a particularly interesting 
34 The 1991 point estimate is 0.068 (0.082); the 2001 point estimate is −0.010 (0.076). 
Figure 5. Yearly RD Estimates for Policy Outcomes and Tax Instruments
notes: Yearly RD coefficients. Vertical axis: point estimates of local linear regressions with optimal bandwidth 
computed following Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014a, b). Horizontal axis: year. The central line is the point 
estimate; the lateral lines represent the 95 percent confidence interval.
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dimension here because Italian geography is correlated with economic develop-
ment, crime rates, and shirking (e.g., see Ichino and Maggi 2000; Nannicini et al. 
2013; Casaburi and Troiano 2016), and it could thus be associated with opportunis-
tic manipulation too.
Based on this large amount of supporting evidence on Assumption 1, in online 
Appendix Table A5, we directly test Assumption 2 under the maintained hypothesis 
that Assumption 1 holds. In particular, we check whether cities just below or just 
above the 5,000 threshold respond differently to fiscal rules. We use the introduction 
of the DSP in 1999 for all municipalities as an experiment to test for the absence 
of any differential response around 5,000. Specifically, we implement diff-in-disc 
estimations in the interval 1997–2000, using 1999–2000 as the posttreatment period 
and 1997–1998 as the pretreatment period. All outcome variables are balanced 
around the threshold before/after 1999, confirming the assumption that the DSP did 
not interact with the confounding wage discontinuity and did not bind differently 
across different sides of the population threshold.35
In online Appendix Figure A3, we test the sensitivity of the estimates to the band-
width for the other budget items. Point estimates for tax revenues, tax rates, and 
central transfers show the larger sensitivity to the bandwidth choice.
We also perform a set of placebo tests to evaluate the possibility that our results 
arise from random chance rather than a causal relationship. In the online Appendix 
Figures A4 and A5, in the spirit of DellaVigna and La Ferrara (2010), we imple-
ment—respectively, for deficit and for fiscal gap—a set of diff-in-disc estimations at 
false population thresholds below and above 5,000 (namely, any point from 3,900 to 
4,900 and from 5,100 to 6,100 in order to stay sufficiently away from the true policy 
threshold). At these false thresholds, we expect to find no systematic evidence of 
treatment effects similar to our baseline results. The two figures report the cumula-
tive density function of these 2,000 placebo point estimates (using a specification 
with third-order spline polynomial). The intuition here is that we should not observe 
too many coefficients outside the interval from the positive and negative value of the 
coefficient estimated using the true threshold. Indeed, all of the placebo coefficients 
are below our estimated coefficients for both deficit and fiscal gap, and the cumu-
lative density function of the normalized coefficients is much steeper around zero. 
Only 3 percent of the placebo coefficients for the deficit and 5.5 percent of the pla-
cebo coefficients for fiscal gap are larger from the true coefficient in absolute value, 
and all of them have a different (negative) sign with respect to the (true) baseline 
estimate. On the whole, these placebo tests provide strong support for the robustness 
of our main results on fiscal discipline.
In online Appendix Table A7, we show that the effects are qualitatively similar 
when we drop years 2001 and 2002 (the years where every municipality faced the 
restraint) from the estimation. Finally, we show in the online Appendix Table A8 
that the results are qualitatively identical when dropping 1999 and 2000 (the years 
where no municipality faced a fiscal restraint) from the estimations. The results in 
35 The city of Romentino was an outlier due to a lucrative sale of land in 1998 and it was removed from the 
sample. Our results do not change with the inclusion of this city, with the exception of bigger standard errors for 
other revenues. 
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the previous tables suggest that the exact formulation of the restraint is not driving 
our main results, and this is encouraging for the external validity of our estimates.
C. political Economy of Fiscal Adjustment
In this section, we exploit our research design to shed light on the political econ-
omy of the deficit. Evaluating the differential response of different politicians and 
voters to an exogenous (albeit local) variation in fiscal rules can identify important 
determinants of politically motivated deficits, and it provides new evidence about the 
costs and benefits of fiscal restraints. We start by looking at three political factors. 
First, we consider whether mayors face a binding term limit or not, because mayors 
in their second term have no reelection incentives and no personal stake in the city’s 
budget for the following years. Second, we consider the number of parties in the 
city council—which, hence, vote on the budget proposed by the mayor—to capture 
political fragmentation and potential common pool problems. Third, we consider 
the age profile of citizens in our municipalities. We finally relate our findings to 
models that formalize the trade-off between reduced flexibility of fiscal policy and 
increased discipline on politically motivated deficit. Specifically, we consider the 
speed of public good provision (the ratio between provided public goods and the 
promised public goods promised to the voters in the provisional budget).
The results are reported in Table 5, where we implement the baseline  diff-in-disc 
estimations interacting our treatment with: (i) binding versus nonbinding term limit; 
(ii) the number of parties in the city council; (iii) the fraction of inhabitants belong-
ing to the youngest cohort; and (iv) the speed of public good provision. For each 
heterogeneity exercise, we report the diff-in-disc estimates of the relevant interac-
tion. We are aware that the causal interpretation of the relevant interaction rests on 
an additional conditional independence assumption. This is why we report a second 
interaction coefficient (with covariates) indicating whether this difference is robust to 
a specification including a full set of interactions with covariates at the municipality 
level (namely, the average taxable income; mayor’s years of schooling; and whether 
the municipality is in the north of the country). If this test is also statistically signifi-
cant, it means that the differential impact of relaxing fiscal rules across our heteroge-
neity dimensions is not driven by those observable confounding city characteristics.36
First, we focus on term limits, exploiting the fact that Italian mayors face a 
 two-term limit.37 Theoretical models suggest that the expectation of a future election 
can affect policies because politicians who plan to run again for office must please 
the voters sufficiently often to merit reelection (Barro 1973, Banks and Sundaram 
1998). We find that the fiscal (de)stabilization induced by the relaxation of the  fiscal 
restraints is driven by mayors without a binding term limit, although this result 
36 As a final robustness check on our heterogeneity analysis, we repeat the falsification test in 1999 for all the 
above dimensions. Specifically, in online Appendix Table A6 we implement the above heterogeneity  diff-in-disc 
estimations in the interval 1997–2000, using 1999–2000 as the posttreatment period and 1997–1998 as the pretreat-
ment period. The fact that no effect and no difference are ever statistically significant means that municipalities 
around the threshold in different heterogeneity subsamples are not on differential trends before 2001. In other 
words, the DSP did not bind differently across those subsamples. 
37 It should be noted that: (i) municipalities do not vote at the same time, and (ii) the DSP was independent of 
local politics because it followed agreements between the European Union and its member countries. 
24 AmErIcAn EconomIc JournAL: AppLIEd EconomIcs JuLY 2016
becomes borderline insignificant in some specifications that control for covariates. 
As mayors without term limits face both stronger reelection concerns and a higher 
expected probability that they (or their party) will remain in power, the above result 
provides more support for models linking deficits to reelection incentives (see 
Aghion and Bolton 1990) or to politicians’ pandering to voters (see Maskin and 
Tirole 2004), rather than models viewing deficits as a way to tie the hands of future 
governments with different political preferences (see Alesina and Tabellini 1990; 
Persson and Svensson 1989; Tabellini and Alesina 1990). Unfortunately, we are 
not able to provide further empirical evidence on strategic voting models because 
of the lack of a clear expected reelection probability outcome in our data.38 We are 
38 See Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) for an empirical evaluation of strategic voting models. 
Table 5—Political Economy of Deficit Bias
Without covariates With covariates 
Treatment × term limit −27.653 −23.680
(13.858) (13.862)
Treatment 28.881 −23.869
(11.707) (67.936)
Term limit (mean) 0.441 0.441
Treatment × number of parties 10.372 5.094
(5.377) (2.807)
Treatment −8.613 −8.809
(14.922) (37.419)
Number of parties (mean) 2.66 2.66
Treatment × young cohort −8.275 −8.998
(3.869) (3.714)
Treatment 135.931 122.359
(54.665) (77.036)
Young cohort (mean) 14.164 14.164
Treatment × public good −3.168 −2.587
(1.444) (1.385)
Treatment 264.986 181.683
(114.755) (142.206)
Public good (mean) 78.120 78.120
 h 600 600
Observations 2,414 2,414
notes: Municipalities between 3,500 and 7,000 inhabitants; budget years between 1999 and 
2004. Diff-in-disc estimates of the impact of relaxing fiscal rules on fiscal discipline below 
5,000 after 2001 interacted with the relevant heterogeneity dimension (that is, dummy for 
binding term limit; number of parties in the city council; dummy for above-median percent-
age of young cohorts; dummy for above-median speed of public good provision). Estimation 
method: local linear regression with the optimal bandwidth  h estimated following Calonico, 
Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014a, b). The with covariates specification evaluates whether the esti-
mates are statistically different in the two subsamples also controlling for a full set of interac-
tions between the above specifications and appropriate covariates, which are: average taxable 
income; mayor’s years of schooling; and whether the municipality is in the North. All variables 
are per capita and in 2009 euros. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are 
in parentheses.
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also not able to rule out alternative channels that can rationalize our result on term 
limits, such as the possibility that political experience per se has an effect on how 
mayors react to the relaxation of fiscal rules, though it is encouraging that some of 
the results survive to controlling for the mayor’s characteristics.39
Second, we focus on political fragmentation. Political fragmentation generally 
arises when several agents have an active role in the allocation of the budget, each 
with its own constituency to please, and each with some weight in the final decision. 
There are two key determinants that affect how much a policymaker internalizes the 
costs of the demanded share of the budget: the number of decision makers partici-
pating in the bargaining process and the institutional rules determining the aggrega-
tion of preferences. Most empirical studies focus on the first determinant because 
of a lack of reliable proxies for the rules that determine the budget allocation across 
countries. We also follow this previous literature by focusing on the first determi-
nant. However, one advantage of our setting is that we can safely assume that the 
rules that determine the allocation of the budget are constant around our threshold. 
Our proxy for political fragmentation is the number of parties in the city councils. 
The majority of the municipalities in our sample have either one, or two, or three 
parties represented in the city council. Typically, there is at least one party in charge 
of the municipal government, and one party in the opposition. The estimation results 
reported in Table 5 show that the increase in deficit is stronger the higher is the num-
ber of parties in the city council. Our favorite interpretation of this result is that is 
consistent with models that explain fiscal instability in terms of political fragmenta-
tion or dynamic common pool (see Persson and Tabellini 2000). However, this may 
not be the only interpretation of how political fragmentation affects fiscal instabil-
ity. For instance, other existing models predict a negative relationships between the 
number of parties and fiscal discipline (Pettersson-Lidbom 2012; Hargaden 2014). 
Because of the nature of our setting and our evidence, we do not aim at discriminat-
ing among the different models of how parties affect deficit.
Consistent with the model of Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2012), the defi-
cit increases after the relaxation of the rule in cities with a smaller proportion 
of young citizens. Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2012) propose a dynamic 
 politico-economic theory of fiscal policy for small open economies, and we view 
this model as particularly relevant for our setting because small cities are a rea-
sonably good approximation of small open economies. The main intuition of their 
model is that younger citizens impose a disciplining effect on fiscal policy, because 
they internalize the future costs of a presently loose fiscal policy. Both of the above 
predictions are borne out by our empirical findings.40
Finally, we check whether our treatment interacts with the speed of public good 
provision: the ratio between the public goods actually delivered and the public goods 
39 Given that we can control for the selection of mayors (years of schooling), our findings provide additional 
support to the literature that focuses on the effect of term limit on political accountability and in-office performance 
(see Besley and Case 1995; List and Sturm 2006). 
40 Another testable prediction of their model is that deficit should be higher for cities where the mayor is 
affiliated with right-wing parties. While most of the mayors in our sample are not affiliated with parties that can 
be clearly mapped to the ideological spectrum, we also find evidence that is consistent with this prediction in the 
(small) subset of mayors affiliated to a political party. 
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promised to the voters in the budget. Our indicator of the speed of public good pro-
vision is calculated as a mayor-specific measure, averaged across all the years each 
mayor is in office.41 These results show that the increase in deficit arises only for 
mayors that systematically under-provide the public goods promised to voters in the 
provisional budget. This evidence could be interpreted as consistent with a potential 
negative effect for voters following the relaxation of the rule, only to the extent to 
which politicians who consistently over-promise public goods are those who care 
more about reelection rather than social welfare (Besley 2007). However, we can 
not rule out that mayors who are slower in providing public goods provide goods 
of better quality, and, hence, the previous result should be interpreted with caution.
All in all, the results discussed in this section suggest that fiscal restraints are 
more likely to bind for cities characterized by political failures.
V. Conclusion
Limiting the increase of public debt is a key policy issue in most economies. 
Fiscal rules are usually considered one of the potential solutions to public debt 
growth. In this paper, we rely on a novel quasi-experimental design to show that 
fiscal rules enforced by a national government can be effective in causing a reduc-
tion of the accumulation of debt by local governments. Additionally, we are able to 
investigate the composition of fiscal adjustment and we show that unconstrained 
cities have lower tax rates and lower revenues following the relaxation of fiscal 
rules. We then link our results to existing theories of fiscal adjustment to provide 
new evidence about the costs and benefits of restraining fiscal policy. We show that 
a deficit arises only where many parties are represented in the city council, mayors 
can run for reelection, there is a smaller proportion of young citizens, and mayors 
systematically underprovide the promised public good. These results suggest that 
fiscal restraints can be more effective when political distortions are larger.
We are aware that the enhanced internal validity of our evaluation design comes 
at the price of lower external validity, as is always the case in (local) econometric 
strategies based on policy discontinuities. However, we believe that the fact that the 
restraint worked in Italy, a country often cited for poor legal enforcement, could 
potentially offer a valuable lesson for other developed economies.
Our results raise a number of questions for further research. First, we show that 
fiscal rules, when accompanied by a proper enforcement mechanism, can be effec-
tive also in regulatory environments characterized by serious commitment issues 
such as the Italian case. Hence, fiscal rules might be useful in far more cases than 
those suggested by the conventional wisdom, and the optimal design of fiscal rules 
should take into account political incentives in the enforcement of the rules. Second, 
our results on the composition of fiscal adjustment suggest that stabilizing fiscal pol-
icy through revenues and through expenditures might not be politically  equivalent, 
although the standard errors don’t allow drawing a strong conclusion. With this last 
caveat in mind, in our setting, politicians seem to be more prone to raising taxes 
41 Rogoff (1990) argues that electoral incentives might distort fiscal policy because of the distorted incentives 
to over-provide public goods when it is more salient for voters. 
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rather than cutting expenditures to comply with an exogenous incentive for fiscal 
stability. Alesina and Ardagna (2010) raise the point that expenditure reductions are 
usually more expansionary than tax increases, regardless of the existence of a fiscal 
rule. Future research could explore the hypothesis that fiscal rules targeting expendi-
tures may improve welfare compared to rules targeting deficit. Third, little is known 
about the political incentives that drive the choice between cutting expenditures and 
raising taxes to achieve stabilization. A rapidly growing literature in public eco-
nomics has shown how the salience of tax changes affects behavioral responses (see 
Chetty, Looney, and Kroft 2009). It is an exciting direction for future research to 
investigate whether public good provision is subject to similar issues, and whether 
policymakers can exploit voters’ behavioral biases in their favor.42
Our last set of empirical results implies that political incentives drive local gov-
ernment responses to exogenously imposed fiscal restraints. Since restricting tax 
smoothing is the main welfare cost of fiscal restraints identified by the macroeco-
nomic literature, and since mechanisms for smoothing business cycle fluctuations, 
such as unemployment insurance, are often administered at the national level (as 
discussed by Gavin and Perotti 1997 and Hines 2011), our results suggest that fiscal 
rules imposed on subnational governments might have limited welfare costs and 
significant benefits.
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